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Abstract: A product set of pure strategies is a prep set (‘prep’ is short for ‘preparation’)
if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have
about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exist in a
class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal
prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and
rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model
of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D83
1I am indebted to Jörgen Weibull, Marcel Dreef, Peter Borm, and several seminar audiences for
comments and stimulating conversations on this topic.
11 Introduction
Simplicity, the bias towards strategic behavior of low complexity, is a major driving force
in actual decision making and game theory. This can be due to various reasons: complex
plans may be hard to implement and likely to break down, since they are more susceptible
to mistakes. They are more diﬃcult to learn, and a decision maker may not have access
to extremely intricate strategies due to bounds on his rationality or cognition.
Pure Nash equilibria of strategic games have several advantages over equilibria in
mixed strategies, most of which boil down to their simplicity. In the ﬁrst place, they
provide clear and unambiguous recommendations by avoiding complicated randomization
devices. In the second place, pure strategies are directly observable, but it is hard to
observe mixed strategies, unless as an aggregate of long run behavior. Moreover, mixed
strategies may in some occasions not be reasonable objects of choice; see for instance
the discussion in section 3.2 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). Finally, experimental
evidence seems to point out that players relatively easily learn to play pure equilibria,
while it is intuitively much more diﬃcult to learn the exact probability measures that
constitute a mixed equilibrium. Selten et al. (2001, p. 23), for instance, state that:
“...under favorable conditions the game theoretic notion of a pure strategy
equilibrium is strongly supported by the observed behavior of sophisticated
players. Of course the tendency towards pure strategy equilibrium plays was
much less pronounced in the beginning. The game theoretic equilibrium notion
is not naturally present in the minds of most unexperienced subjects. But, as
far as pure strategy equilibrium is concerned, it is clearly learned in repeated
tournaments.”
On the other hand (ibid, p. 16):
“In the case of games without pure strategy equilibria, we do not observe a
tendency towards a similarly clear answer to the question how to play such
games.”
2The attraction of pure equilibria induces an interest in strategic games possessing such
equilibria, like the diﬀerent classes of potential games studied by Monderer and Shap-
ley (1996), Voorneveld and Norde (1997), and Voorneveld (2000). In general, however,
existence of pure equilibria is not guaranteed.
This paper introduces a set-valued extension of the pure Nash equilibrium concept
that is shown to give a nonempty set of recommendations in a large class of strategic
games. Players, whether they are organizations (households, ﬁrms, boards of directors,
etc.) or individual decision makers, often do not stick to playing a single action. Rather,
they seek recourse to a certain ‘toolkit’ of strategies that is supposed to provide optimal
responses to the eventualities expected by each player in the game. This insight has
generated a body of literature suggesting set-valued solutions instead of the usual point-
valued solutions like the Nash equilibrium concept and its reﬁnements. Examples of such
set-valued solution concepts include the product sets of minimax/maximin strategies in
two-player zero-sum games (von Neumann, 1928) or rationalizable strategies (Bernheim,
1984, Pearce, 1984), persistent retracts (Kalai and Samet, 1984), curb sets (Basu and
Weibull, 1991), and cyclically stable sets (Matsui, 1992).
The set-valued solution concept introduced in this paper combines a standard rational-
ity condition, stating that the set of recommended strategies to each player must contain
at least one best reply to whatever belief he may have that is consistent with the rec-
ommendations to the other players, with the players’ aim at simplicity, which encourages
them to maintain a set of strategies that is as small as possible. These are two opposite
eﬀects in our minimal prep sets (‘prep’ is short for ‘preparation’). On one hand, each
player has to be prepared: each player’s toolkit must be suﬃciently large, so that it con-
tains at least one best reply against any belief he may entertain about the behavior of
his opponents that is consistent with the solution. On the other hand, the decision mak-
ers’ aim at simplicity motivates a set that is as small as possible. This is what discerns
minimal prep sets from the minimal curb sets introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991),
which are product sets of pure strategies containing not just some, but all best responses
against beliefs restricted to opponents’ recommendations.
3Notice that the strategies played in a pure equilibrium indeed constitute a minimal
prep set: each player uses one pure strategy, which is as far as one can go without violating
nonemptiness, and it provides him with a best response against the unique belief on the
opponents’ strategy proﬁle that is consistent with this recommendation.
In the game in Figure 1, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (L,r) is the unique
pure Nash equilibrium. The unique minimal prep set {L}×{ r} provides the same rec-
ommendation, but the curb notion has no cutting power: the only curb set is the entire




























Figure 1: An extensive form game and its associated strategic form
tion than the curb notion, but there is always a trade-oﬀ between robustness and cutting
power. The curb notion, by requiring that a curb set contains all its best replies, is a
very robust concept, but – as in the example – may not be very selective. On the other
hand, minimal prep sets, while typically singling out smaller sets, may exclude equivalent
best replies. Thus, minimal prep sets put more stress on the simplicity of behavior, one
of the major concerns in procedurally rational decision making (Rubinstein, 1998). There
is substantial empirical support for this type of behavior that can be due to inertia or
a status quo bias; see Kahneman et al. (1991) for an overview of experimental ﬁndings
and Vega-Redondo (1993) for possible theoretical underpinnings. This motivates a closer
study of simple and inertial behavior in a game theoretic context, aspects that minimal
prep sets are meant to capture.
Diﬀerent types of learning processes have been shown to eventually settle down within
the minimal curb sets of a strategic game (cf. Hurkens, 1995, Young, 1998, and Kosfeld et
al., 2001), thus providing dynamic support for the notion of minimal curb sets. The ﬁnal
4part of this paper introduces a class of ﬁnite Markov processes as a model of adaptive
play in ﬁnite strategic games to support the notion of minimal prep sets. Each player
adjusts over time the toolkit of actions that he considers appropriate by selecting some
pure strategies and discarding others. Players have a limited memory and choose best
responses to beliefs supported by observed past play. This conforms with much of the
literature on learning (cf. Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Two distinctive features of the
model are the following:
Status quo bias/inertia: Eachtime the game is played, each player ﬁrst checks whether
his current toolkit contains a best reply to his belief about the strategic behavior of
his opponents; this conforms with a status quo bias (cf. Kahneman et al., 1991).
Recent past as focal point: If the toolkit does not leave the player prepared with a
best response, he adds a new pure strategy to his toolkit by backtracking and
selecting one of the most recently discarded best replies (or an arbitrary best reply
in case he has not played such before).
If players act in accordance with such an adjustment process, play eventually settles down
in a minimal prep set.
The material is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation and preliminaries.
In Section 3, prep sets are formally deﬁned and minimal prep sets are shown to exist
subject to minor topological constraints. Moreover, the concept is compared with other
solution concepts: the Nash equilibrium concept, rationalizability, and curb sets. Section
4 discusses a class of adjustment processes which in Section 5 are shown to settle down
to play within minimal prep sets. Section 6 contains concluding remarks, including a
discussion of consistency of minimal prep sets and experimental support.
2 Notation and preliminaries
Some set-theoretical notation: ⊆ denotes weak set inclusion, ⊂ denotes proper set inclu-
sion. For a ﬁxed set X, the complement of Y ⊆ X (w.r.t. X) is denoted by Y c := X \Y .
5A strategic game is a tuple G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N,w h e r eN is a nonempty, ﬁnite
set of players, each player i ∈ N has a nonempty set of pure strategies (or actions) Ai
and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : ×j∈N Aj → R.W r i t eA = ×i∈N Ai
and for each i ∈ N, A−i = ×j∈N\{i} Aj.
Payoﬀs are extended to mixed strategies in the usual way. Assuming each Ai to be a
topological space, ∆(Ai) denotes the set of Borel probability measures over Ai.U s i n ga
common, minor abuse of notation, α−i denotes both an element of ×j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj) speci-
fying a proﬁle of mixed strategies of the opponents of player i ∈ N, and the probability
measure it induces over the set A−i of pure strategy proﬁles of his opponents. Beliefs of
player i take the form of such a mixed strategy proﬁle. Similarly, if Bi ⊆ Ai is a Borel
set, then ∆(Bi) denotes the set of Borel probability measures with support in Bi:
∆(Bi)={αi ∈ ∆(Ai) | αi(Bi)=1 }.
As usual, (ai,α −i) is the proﬁle of strategies where player i ∈ N plays ai ∈ Ai and his op-
ponents play according to the mixed strategy proﬁle α−i =( αj)j∈N\{i} ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj).
G is the class of strategic games G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N where for each player i ∈ N:
(a) Ai is a compact Hausdorﬀ topological space;
(b) ui is suﬃciently measurable: for each ai ∈ Ai and each α−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj),t h e
expected payoﬀ ui(ai,α −i)=

A−i ui(ai,a −i) dα−i is well-deﬁned and ﬁnite;
(c) ui is upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) on Ai, i.e., for each α−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj) and
each r ∈ R,t h es e t{ai ∈ Ai | ui(ai,α −i) ≥ r} is closed.
The set G contains two subclasses that are of importance in the remainder of the paper,
namely the set of games where each Ai is a compact subset of a metric space and each ui
is continuous (as in Proposition 3.3), and the set of ﬁnite strategic games, i.e., the set of
strategic games in which each of the players has a ﬁnite set of pure strategies (as in the
examples and Sections 4 and 5).
Let i ∈ N and let α−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj) b eab e l i e fo fp l a y e ri.Th es e t
BRi(α−i)={ai ∈ Ai |∀ bi ∈ Ai : ui(ai,α −i) ≥ ui(bi,α −i)}
6is the set of pure best responses of player i against α−i. Since every u.s.c. function on a
compact set achieves a maximum, it follows by deﬁnition of G that each player in a game
G ∈Galways has a nonempty set of best responses against an arbitrary belief.
Theorem 3.2, the existence theorem for minimal prep sets, uses the following version
of the Cantor Intersection Principle, a proof of which is included for easy reference.
Lemma 2.1 [Cantor Intersection Principle] Let X be a compact Hausdorﬀ topologi-
cal space and {Fk | k ∈ I} a collection of compact subsets of X with the ﬁnite intersection
property:
∀J ⊆ I,J ﬁnite: ∩k∈J Fk = ∅.
Then ∩k∈IFk is nonempty and compact.





Since each Fk is a compact subset of the Hausdorﬀ space X,e a c hFk is closed (Aliprantis
and Border, 1994, Lemma 2.30. Recall that compact subsets of non-Hausdorﬀ spaces
need not be closed, ibid, Example 2.31), so its complement Fc
k is open. By (1), the sets
{Fc
k | k ∈ I} form an open cover of the compact set X, so there is a ﬁnite set J ⊆ I with
X = ∪k∈JF c
k.Th i si m p l i e st h a t ∩k∈JFk = ∅, contradicting the ﬁnite intersection property.
So ∩k∈IFk = ∅.S i n c ee a c hFk is closed, ∩k∈IFk is a closed subset of the compact set X,
hence compact. 
3 Preparation
The set-valued solution concept introduced in this paper combines a standard rationality
condition, stating that the set of recommended strategies to each player must contain at
least one best reply to whatever belief he may have that is consistent with the recommen-
dations to the other players, with the players’ aim at simplicity, which encourages them
7to maintain a set of strategies that is as small as possible. Formally, (minimal) prep sets
are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N∈G .A prep set is a product set X =
×i∈N Xi,w h e r e
(a) for each i ∈ N, Xi ⊆ Ai is a nonempty, compact set of pure strategies;
(b) for each i ∈ N a n de a c hb e l i e fα−i of player i with support in X−i,t h es e tXi
contains at least one best response of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj): BRi(α−i) ∩ Xi = ∅.
Ap r e ps e tX is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of X. 
Every strategic game in G has a minimal prep set.
Theorem 3.2 Let G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N∈G . Then G has a minimal prep set.
Proof. Let Q denote the set of all prep sets of G.S i n c eui is u.s.c. in the i-th coordinate
and Ai is compact, Ai contains a best response against any belief α−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(Aj)
that an arbitrary player i ∈ N may have: the entire strategy space A is a prep set. So Q is
nonempty and partially ordered via set inclusion. According to the Hausdorﬀ Maximality
Principle, Q contains a maximal nested subset R.F o re a c h i ∈ N,l e tXi = ∩Y ∈RYi be
the intersection of player i’s strategies in the nested set R. The product set X = ×i∈N Xi
is shown to be a minimal prep set.
Let i ∈ N.S i n c e Yi is nonempty and compact for each prep set Y ∈ R and the
collection {Yi | Y ∈ R} is nested, Lemma 2.1 implies that Xi is nonempty and compact.
Let α−i b eab e l i e fo fp l a y e ri over ×j∈N\{i} Xj. To see that Xi ∩ BRi(α−i) = ∅,w r i t e
Xi ∩ BRi(α−i)=[ ∩Y ∈RYi] ∩ BRi(α−i)
= ∩Y ∈R[Yi ∩ BRi(α−i)]. (2)
For each Y ∈ R, the set Yi ∩ BRi(α−i) is nonempty (since Y is a prep set and α−i ∈
×j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj) ⊆× j∈N\{i} ∆(Yj)) and compact, since it is an intersection of the compact
8set Yi and the set BRi(α−i), which is closed, since it is the set of maximizers of an u.s.c.
function. Moreover, the collection {Yi ∩ BRi(α−i) | Y ∈ R} is nested, since R is nested.
Again applying Lemma 2.1 yields that the set in (2) is nonempty. So X is indeed a prep
set. The fact that it is minimal follows directly from the fact that R is a maximal nested
subset of Q. 
Having proved the existence of minimal prep sets in a wide class of games, let us compare
the concept with other solution concepts. As mentioned before, if a ∈ A is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium, then ×i∈N {ai} is easily seen to be a minimal prep set. Consequently,
the minimal prep notion can be seen as a set-valued extension of the pure Nash equilibrium
concept. Every prep set of a suﬃciently structured game contains the support of a Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3 Let G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N be a strategic game where for each i ∈ N:
• Ai is a compact subset of a metric space;
• ui is a continuous von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
Then every prep set of G contains the support of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Proof. Let X = ×i∈N Xi ⊆× i∈N Ai be a prep set of G.Th eg a m e N,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈N
obtained from G by restricting attention to the nonempty and compact strategy sets
(Xi)i∈N meets the conditions of Glicksberg’s (1952) theorem for the existence of a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium, say α. This is also a Nash equilibrium of the original game
G,s i n c eX was assumed to be a prep set and consequently contains at least one best
response in G to α−i for each player i ∈ N: although Ai\Xi may contain alternative best
responses to α−i, there are no better options. 
Conversely, not every strategy in the support of a mixed Nash equilibrium is necessarily
contained in a minimal prep set. See Example 3.4.
9It is easy to see that every strategy in a minimal prep set X = ×i∈N Xi of a ﬁnite
strategic game is rationalizable: for every i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi, strategy xi has to be a
best response to some belief α−i over X−i, otherwise X would not be a minimal prep set,
since xi can be omitted from Xi and the resulting product set would be a smaller prep
set. Example 3.4 indicates that the set of strategies included in a minimal prep set can
be a proper subset of the set of rationalizable strategies.
Recall from Basu and Weibull (1991) that a curb set (‘curb’ is mnemonic for ‘closed
under rational behavior’) of a strategic game G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N is a product set
X = ×i∈N Xi,w h e r e
(a) for each i ∈ N, Xi ⊆ Ai is a nonempty, compact set of pure strategies;
(b) for each i ∈ N a n de a c hb e l i e fα−i of player i with support in X−i,t h es e tXi
contains all best responses of player i against his belief:
∀i ∈ N,∀α−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj): BRi(α−i) ⊆ Xi.
Ac u r bs e tX is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of X. Comparing this with
Deﬁnition 3.1, one sees that minimal curb sets are highly robust by requiring all best
replies against beliefs consistent with the solution concept to be included in the solution,
while prep sets require that every player is prepared against such beliefs by including
at least some best replies. Thus, minimal prep sets put more stress on the simplicity of
behavior, one of the major concerns in procedurally rational decision making (Rubinstein,
1998). Recall from the example in Figure 1 that this may provide signiﬁcant additional
cutting power over the curb notion.
Example 3.4 The minimal prep sets and minimal curb sets of the game in Figure 2 are




2R) is a Nash equilibrium,
so B is rationalizable, but not included in any of the minimal prep or curb sets. 
Every curb set of a game G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N∈Gcontains a minimal prep set: if





Figure 2: Proper selection of rationalizable strategies
by restricting attention to the nonempty and compact strategy sets (Xi)i∈N is again an
element of G and consequently contains a minimal prep set. Since X was a curb set, this is
easily seen to be a minimal prep set of the original game G as well. Example 3.5 indicates
that the minimal prep sets may contain a proper subset of the strategies contained in the
minimal curb sets. Finally, every curb set is a prep set, so if a curb set is contained in a
minimal prep set, the two sets are necessarily equal.
Example 3.5 All pure strategies in the game in Figure 3 are rationalizable. The unique
(minimal) curb set is {T,B}×{L,R}, the minimal prep sets are {T}×{L} and {B}×{L}.
Pure strategy R, which is included in the minimal curb set of the game, is not contained




Figure 3: Proper selection of curb strategies
Another example illustrating the diﬀerence in the cutting power between curb and prep
sets is the following class of games. Consider a two-player game G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N,
where A1 = A2 = {a1,...,a k} for some k ∈ N,k≥ 2. Assume that player 1’s unique best
reply to an action of player 2 is to play the same action:
BR1(a)={a} for all a ∈ A2. (3)
11Player 2 is indiﬀerent between his actions if player 1 chooses a1:
BR2(a1)=A2. (4)
If player 1 chooses a diﬀerent action, the best replies of player 2 are a nonempty subset
of actions with a lower index:
BR2(a) = ∅,BR 2(a) ⊆{ a1,...,a −1} if 1 <≤ k. (5)
Let us sketch an economic examples of this class of games: The two players may – for
instance – have produced a software package and decide on which of k possible dates
to release its product. Firm 1, an incumbent in the market, knows that if he releases
the package at the same moment as or earlier than Firm 2, a market entrant, he will
get the entire market due to its good reputation. To guarantee maximal proﬁt, Firm 1
(for instance due to the ability of further debugging) has an incentive to release at the
same moment as Firm 2 does, thus motivating (3). If Firm 1 releases immediately, the
market is satiated, making Firm 2 indiﬀerent between his release dates, motivating (4);
releasing ahead of Firm 1 will give Firm 2 a ﬁxed part of the market, thus motivating a
best-response correspondence of type (5).
This is a class of games in which the unique minimal prep set coincides with the unique
pure Nash equilibrium of the game. The curb notion, however, has no cutting power: the
unique curb set consists of the entire set of pure strategy proﬁles.
Proposition 3.6 In the game G the following hold:
(a) the unique pure Nash equilibrium equals (a1,a 1);
(b) If X1 × X2 i sap r e ps e to fG,t h e na1 ∈ X1;
(c) the unique minimal prep set equals {a1}×{ a1};
(d) the unique (hence minimal) curb set equals A1 × A2.
12Proof. (a): follows easily from the best reply functions.
(b): Suppose a1 / ∈ X1.L e ta ∈ X1 be the element of X1 with lowest index >1.S i n c e
X1×X2 is a prep set, (5) implies that there is an am ∈ BR2(a)∩X2 ⊆{ a1,...,a −1}∩X2,
which implies m< . But then BR1(am) ∩ X1 = {am}∩X1 = ∅,s ot h a tam ∈ X1.S i n c e
m< , this contradicts our assumption that a is the element of X1 with lowest index.
Hence a1 ∈ X1.
(c): Since (a1,a 1) is a pure Nash equilibrium, it follows that {a1}×{ a1} is a minimal
prep set. Suppose there exists a diﬀerent minimal prep set X = X1 × X2.Th e n a1 ∈ X1
by (b) and a1 / ∈ X2, otherwise {a1}×{a1}⊂X, contradicting minimality of X. We prove
by induction that a / ∈ X1 and a / ∈ X2 for all  ∈{ 2,...,k}.W i t ha1 / ∈ X2 this implies
that X2 = ∅, a contradiction.
Since a1 / ∈ X2,a n dBR2(a2)={a1} by (5), and X is a prep set, it follows that a2 / ∈ X1.
Since a2 / ∈ X1, BR1(a2)={a2},a n dX is a prep set, it follows that a2 / ∈ X2.Th i sp r o v e s
the claim for  =1 .
Assume the claim is true for all indices in {2,...,} with <k .Tos h o w : a+1 / ∈ X1
and a+1 / ∈ X2. We know by induction and (5) that BR2(a+1) ∩ X2 ⊆{ a1,...,a }∩
X2 = ∅, so the fact that X is a prep set implies that a+1 / ∈ X1.S i n c e a+1 / ∈ X1,
BR1(a+1)={a+1},a n dX is a prep set, it follows that a+1 / ∈ X2. This ﬁnishes the
inductive proof: {a1}×{ a1} is indeed the unique minimal prep set.
(d): Let X = X1 × X2 be a curb set of G. Every curb set of G is a prep set, so a1 ∈ X1
by (b). Since X is curb and BR2(a1)=A2 by (4), this implies that X2 = A2. Moreover,
for every  ∈{ 1,...,k} it holds that a ∈ X2 = A2 and BR1(a)={a},s oa ∈ X1.
Conclude that X1 = A1, ﬁnishing the proof. 
4 Myopic adaptive play
This section presents a class of ﬁnite Markov chains as a model of adaptive play to support
the notion of minimal prep sets: each player adjusts over time the toolkit of actions that
he considers appropriate by selecting some pure strategies and discarding others. In line
13with much of the literature on learning models (cf. Young, 1998, Fudenberg and Levine,
1998), players have a limited memory and choose best responses to beliefs supported by
observed past play. Two distinctive features of the learning model are the following:
Status quo bias/inertia: Eachtime the game is played, each player ﬁrst checks whether
his current toolkit contains a best reply to his belief about the strategic behavior of
his opponents.
Recent past as focal point: If the toolkit does not leave the player prepared with a
best response, he adds a new pure strategy to his toolkit by backtracking and
selecting one of the most recently discarded best replies (or an arbitrary best reply
in case he has not played such before).
Thus, the learning model aims to capture two common experimental observations: the
‘unwillingness’ to change strategic behavior as predicted by the literature on status quo
biases and inertia (cf. Kahneman et al., 1991) and the presence of focal points (cf.
Schelling, 1960).
4.1 State space
A ﬁnite strategic game G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N is played once every time period in
discrete time. At an arbitrary time t, each player i ∈ N is characterized by
• a nonempty ‘toolkit’ Xi ⊆ Ai of actions that he considers appropriate at time t,
• a linear (i.e., complete, reﬂexive, and transitive) order Ri on the set of remaining
actions Ai \ Xi,w h e r exRiy indicates that x ∈ Ai \ Xi is ranked at least as high as
y ∈ Ai \ Xi,
and only observes a sequence with ﬁxed length T ∈ N of past action proﬁles. In this
section and the next, the Markov process speciﬁes an adjustment process for a ﬁxed ﬁnite
strategic game G and histories of ﬁxed length T. The suﬃxes G and T are suppressed for
notational convenience.
14Formally, each element s of the ﬁnite set S of states of the Markov process is described
by a tuple
s =( h,(Xi)i∈N,(Ri)i∈N),
with a history h =( aT,a T−1,...,a 1) ∈ AT of past play indicating that for each k ∈
{1,...,T}, the proﬁle of actions played k periods ago was ak =( ak
i)i∈N ∈ A, a sequence
(Xi)i∈N of toolkits, and a sequence (Ri)i∈N of linear orders over (Ai \ Xi)i∈N.
Notice two speciﬁc features here. First of all, players adjust sets of strategies,r a t h e r
than a single strategy. This corresponds with the models in Artiﬁcial Intelligence and
psychology that consider learning as the acquisition and modiﬁcation of a collection of
skills or methods. In these models, computers and human subjects learn to respond to
a changing environment by adopting and adjusting a set of skills or methods within the
limits set by their technological and cognitional constraints (their strategy space). More-
over, it corresponds with Popper’s evolutionary approach to interactive learning, where
people hold a number of provisional hypotheses or responses to the current environment
and apply a process of adjustment and refutal. His theory (Popper, 1979, p. 261) ‘...is a
largely Darwinian theory...: we try to solve our problems, and to obtain, by a process of
elimination, something approaching adequacy in our tentative solutions.’
Secondly, in state s =( h,(Xi)i∈N,(Ri)i∈N),t h es e tXc
i of actions outside i’s current
toolkit is assumed to be linearly ordered. This is simply an assumption that speciﬁes how
the players store the elements of their pure strategy set in their memory. The properties of
the myopic adjustment process explained in the next subsection – in particular property
A4 – guarantee that this will be a temporal order. This corresponds in a natural way
with actual learning by both machines and humans. In artiﬁcial intelligence, the potential
choices of a machine are typically ordered in a list of records; new items are often stacked
on top of the list, so that a search for items satisfying certain criteria proceeds according
to a last-in-ﬁrst-out principle. The same ordering on basis of time is common in human
learning: it is easiest to remember that which has been added most recently to the memory.
Consequently, in both cases, there is a clear focality on the recent past, justifying a
temporal ordering Ri.
15Given a history h =( aT,a T−1,...,a 1) ∈ AT of past play, let r(h)=a1 ∈ A denote the
rightmost element of h, the proﬁle of actions played in the previous period according to




i} is the set
of actions played by i in the previous k periods and pi(h): =pi(h,T) is the set of actions
played by i in the entire history of length T that he can remember. A successor of history
h is any history h ∈ AT obtained by deleting the leftmost element of h and attaching a
new rightmost element.
4.2 Transition matrices
Having deﬁned the set S of states, we proceed to the set of transition matrices P : S×S →
[0,1],w h e r eP(s,s) indicates the probability of a transition from state s to state s in
one period. Let P be the set of transition matrices P where P(s,s) > 0 if and only if
states s =( h,(Xi)i∈N,(Ri)i∈N) and s =( h,(X
i)i∈N,(R
i)i∈N) satisfy conditions A1 to A4
below. Conditions A1 and A2 are standard: history h is replaced by a successor h where
the pure strategy ri(h) ∈ Ai chosen by each player i ∈ N is a best response from his
toolkit X
i to some belief α∗
−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(pj(h)) over the observed past play. Condition
A3 indicates that player i will check whether his current toolkit Xi contains a best reply
against his belief α∗
−i. If so, there is no reason to expand it: X
i \ Xi = ∅. Otherwise,
he plays and adds to his toolkit the best response (see A2) ri(h) that is selected by
checking the pure strategies in Ai \ Xi in the order indicated by Ri and choosing the
ﬁrst/highest ranked best response he encounters (if there are several such highest ranked
best responses, he chooses among them arbitrarily). This condition states that addition
of actions to a toolkit only happens if the current toolkit is insuﬃcient. This leaves space
for players to actually discard certain actions from their toolkit between two periods, for
instance because such actions may be considered unnecessary. As mentioned in section4.1,
condition A4 guarantees that the order on the actions outside a player’s toolkit coincides
with the order in which they have been discarded: the most recently discarded actions
will be ranked highest. Together with condition A3, this implies that if an action is added
16to a toolkit, this action is a most recently discarded best response.
[A1] h is a successor of h;
And for each player i ∈ N:
[A2: best response] ri(h) ∈ X
i ∩ BRi(α∗
−i) for some belief α∗
−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(pj(h));
[A3: inertia and backtracking] If BRi(α∗
−i) ∩ Xi = ∅,t h e nX
i \ Xi = ∅. Otherwise,
ri(h) ∈{ ai ∈ BRi(α∗
−i) | aiRibi for all bi ∈ BRi(α∗
−i)} is a highest ranked best
reply against α∗
−i,a n dX
i \ Xi = {ri(h)}.
[A4, Last in, ﬁrst out] the ranking R
i is obtained from Ri by stacking all recently
dismissed actions on top: Let xi,y i ∈ Ai \ X
i.Th e n R
i satisﬁes:
• if xi,y i ∈ Ai \ Xi,t h e nxiR
iyi ⇔ xiRiyi;
• if xi ∈ Xi, but yi / ∈ Xi,t h e nxiR
iyi, but not yiR
ixi.
The ﬁrst point requires that elements that remain outside the toolkit keep the same
order. The second point indicates that newly rejected elements rank higher than
elements that already were outside the toolkit in the previous period.
In these two subsections, we speciﬁed the state space and conditions on the transition
matrices underlying the myopic adjustment process. The process aims to capture a num-
ber of practical aspects of learning by humans and machines: what is learned is a set of
tools or skills that are meant to prepare the players with optimal reactions against beliefs
they might have about opponents’ behavior. These beliefs are based on observations from
a limited past (the last T rounds of play). Players display a status quo bias or inertial
behavior by sticking to their toolkit whenever this provides a best response against their
belief. If no best response is contained in the current toolkit, a most recently played best
response is added, thus stressing the focality of the recent past.
175 Convergence of adaptive play
The purpose of this section is to show that for an arbitrary ﬁnite game and a suﬃciently
long memory, each of the adjustment processes in the class P satisfying conditions A1 to
A4 eventually settles down within a minimal prep set. Three lemmas will pave the road.
The ﬁrst (see also Hurkens, 1995, Lemma 1) indicates that a sequence a1,...,a K ∈ A of
pure strategy proﬁles with the property that for each k =2 ,...,K some player i selects
a pure strategy ak
i / ∈{ a1
i,...,a
k−1
i }, i.e., a pure strategy that he has not used earlier in
the sequence, can have at most length

i∈N |Ai|−|N|+1. The proof is simple: there are

i∈N |Ai| pure strategies, a1 ∈ A captures |N| of them, and at least one pure strategy is
a d d e di ne a c hs t e p .
Lemma 5.1 Let G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N be a ﬁnite strategic game and let a1,...,a K ∈
A be pure strategy proﬁles such that











i∈N |Ai|−| N| +1 .
The following lemma deals with the expansion of toolboxes. Suppose the process is in
a state where the action of each player in the past t p e r i o d si sc o n t a i n e di nh i sc u r r e n t
toolbox, but these actions do not constitute a prep set. Then there is a positive probability
of moving to a state where the actions from the past t +1periods are contained in the
players’ toolkits and the product set of these actions is strictly larger than in the previous
period.
This lemma will be used to construct an increasing sequence of product sets, which




















i for each i ∈ N,
18and suppose that ×i∈N pi(ht,t) is not a prep set. Then the process moves with positive





















i for each i ∈ N, (6)
×i∈N pi(h
t,t) ⊂× i∈N pi(h
t+1,t+1) . (7)
Proof. Since ×i∈N pi(ht,t) is not a prep set, there is a nonempty set T ⊆ N of players
i ∈ N with a belief α∗
−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(pj(ht,t)) over the play in the past t periods such
that BRi(α∗
−i) ∩ pi(ht,t)=∅. Fix such a belief α∗
−i for each i ∈ T,l e tb
t+1
i ∈{ bi ∈
BRi(α∗
−i) | biRt
iai for all ai ∈ BRi(α∗







i }.F o r e a c h i ∈ N \ T,l e tb
t+1
i ∈ pi(ht,t) be a best response




Conditions A1 to A4 imply that the process moves with positive probability from state




i )i∈N) where ht+1 =( aT−t−1,...,a 1,b 1,...,b t,b t+1),
the set X
t+1
i by construction satisﬁes (6) for each player i ∈ N, and the linear orders R
t+1
i
coincide with the linear orders Rt
i restricted to the subsets Ai \ X
t+1
i for each i ∈ N.
Moreover, (7) holds, since pi(ht,t) ⊆ pi(ht+1,t+1 )for each i ∈ N, with strict inclusion
for each i ∈ T. 
Ah i s t o r yh =( aT,...,a 1) lies in X ⊆ A if at ∈ X for each t =1 ,...,T. The ﬁnal lemma
indicates that an absorbing set of the Markov chain has been reached if the process is
in a state s =( h,(Xi)i∈N,(Ri)i∈N) where X := ×i∈N Xi is a minimal prep set and the
history h of observed past play lies in X: all future action proﬁles and all future toolkits
are contained in the minimal prep set X.
Lemma 5.3 Consider a state s =( h,(Xi)i∈N,(Ri)i∈N), where X := ×i∈N Xi is a mini-
mal prep set and the history h lies in X. Every state st =( ht,(Xt
i)i∈N,(Rt
i)i∈N) that can
be reached from s with positive probability in a ﬁnite number t ∈ N of steps satisﬁes:
(i) ht lies in X,
19and for each player i ∈ N:
(ii) Xt
i ⊆ Xi,
(iii) if x ∈ Ai \ Xi and y ∈ Xi \ Xt
i, then yRt
ix,b u tn o txRt
iy.
Proof. The proof is by induction on t ∈ N.L e ts1 =( h1,(X1
i )i∈N,(R1
i)i∈N) be a state
reached from s within one period, let i ∈ N,a n dl e tri(h1) ∈ Ai b et h el a s ta c t i o np l a y e d
by i.A 2i m p l i e st h a tri(h1) ∈ X1
i ∩ BRi(α∗
−i) for some α∗
−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(pj(h)). X is a
minimal prep set and h lies in X,s oBRi(α∗
−i)∩Xi = ∅. A3 then implies that X1
i \Xi = ∅,
i.e., X1
i ⊆ Xi,p r o v i n g(ii) for t =1 .S i n c e h lies in X and ri(h1) ∈ X1
i ⊆ Xi for each
i ∈ N,i tf o l l o w st h a th1 lies in X, proving (i) for t =1 . Assumption A4 directly implies
(iii) for t =1 .





i )i∈N) that can be reached from s with positive probability in t+1




−i) for some α∗
−i ∈× j∈N\{i} ∆(pj(ht)).
If BRi(α∗
−i)∩Xt
i = ∅, A3 implies X
t+1
i \Xt
i = ∅,s ot h a tX
t+1
i ⊆ Xt
i ⊆ Xi by part (ii)
of the induction hypothesis. On the other hand, if BRi(α∗
−i) ∩ Xt
i = ∅, part (iii) of the
induction hypothesis guarantees that all actions in Xi \ Xt
i are ranked above actions in
Ai \ Xi. Moreover, BRi(α∗
−i) ∩ Xi = ∅ since X is a minimal prep set and ht lies in X by
part (i) of the induction hypothesis. A3 then implies that ri(ht+1) is a highest ranked best
response against α∗
−i, i.e., an element of Xi \Xt




Conclude that in both cases X
t+1
i ⊆ Xi,p r o v i n g(ii) for t +1 . History ht lies in X by
part (i) of the induction hypothesis and ri(h
t+1
i ) ∈ Xi for each i ∈ N,s oht+1 lies in X,
proving (i) for t +1 . A4 and part (iii) of the induction hypothesis immediately imply
(iii) for t +1 , completing the inductive argument. 
The three lemmas provide the basis for the convergence theorem, according to which
players eventually learn to coordinate on play inside a minimal prep set. The proof roughly
proceeds as follows. Starting from an arbitrary state, Lemma 5.2 is used to construct an
20increasing sequence of product sets of actions used inside the players’ toolboxes. Lemma
5.1 indicates a bound for the length of this sequence, assuring that after a certain number
of steps, the product set of toolboxes must contain a prep set. Choosing a minimal prep
set from this collection, it is shown that the process proceeds with positive probability
to a state where the players’ toolboxes coincide with their components from the minimal
prep set and the entire observed history of observed past play lies inside this minimal prep
set. Lemma 5.3 indicates that the process has then reached an absorbing set: the process
settles down inside this minimal prep set. Since this happens with positive probability
for every state, it eventually happens with probability one.
Theorem 5.4 For any ﬁnite strategic game G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N, memory length
T ≥

i∈N |Ai|−| N| +1 , and any adjustment process P ∈Psatisfying A1 to A4, play
eventually settles down in a minimal prep set.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: From an arbitrary state s =( h,(Xi)i∈N,(Ri)i∈N) with h =( aT,a T−1,...,a 1),t h e
process always moves to a state s1 =( h1,(X1
i )i∈N,(R1
i)i∈N) with h1 =( aT−1,...,a 1,b 1)








Starting from s1, Lemma 5.2 can be applied repeatedly. Using the bound from Lemma
5.1, there is a K ∈ N,K ≤

i∈N |Ai|−| N| +1 ≤ T such that the process moves
with positive probability in K steps to a state sK =( hK,(XK
i )i∈N,(RK
i )i∈N) where
hK =( aT−K,...,a 1,b 1,...,b K), pi(hK,K)={b1
i,...,b K
i }⊆XK
i for each i ∈ N,a n d
×i∈N pi(hK,K) is a prep set.
Step 2: Let X = ×i∈N Xi ⊆× i∈N pi(hK,K) be a minimal prep set. For each i ∈ N,l e t
Ri be a linear order on Ai \Xi that (analogous with condition A4) coincides with RK
i on
the subset Ai \ XK
i and ranks the additional elements, i.e., those in XK
i \ Xi, above the
elements in Ai \ XK
i :i fx ∈ XK
i \ Xi and y ∈ Ai \XK
i ,t h e nxRiy, but not yRix.
For each t =1 ,...,T, recursively deﬁne the strategy proﬁle ct =( ct
i)i∈N ∈ A as
follows. For each player i ∈ N, c1
i ∈ Xi is a best response to an arbitrary belief α−i ∈
21×j∈N\{i} ∆(Xj) over X−i and from them on, c
t+1
i is a best response in Xi to the previous
pure strategy proﬁle ct
−i:





Since X is a prep set, the proﬁles c1,...,c T are well-deﬁned.
Conditions A1 to A4 imply that the process moves with positive probability from state
sK to state
s






in one period, to state
s







in two periods, and, continuing, to state
s





Step 3: State sK+T satisﬁes the conditions of Lemma 5.3, so from this state onward,
players only play actions from the minimal prep set X.
In conclusion, starting from state s ∈ S, there is a positive probability of proceeding
to a state meeting the requirements of Lemma 5.3, after which play settles down in a
minimal prep set, i.e., a positive probability of proceeding to an absorbing set of states.
Since s ∈ S was chosen arbitrarily, this eventually happens with probability one, ﬁnishing
the proof. 
6 Concluding remarks
Motivated in part by the prominence of pure Nash equilibria in game theoretic exper-
iments, minimal prep sets were introduced as a set-valued extension of the pure Nash
equilibrium concept. As a consequence, minimal prep sets have the same robustness prob-
lem as pure equilibria: as opposed to minimal curb sets, equivalent best replies against
22beliefs that are consistent with the solution may be excluded from a minimal prep set.
Such behavior, however, has substantial empirical support: human choice behavior often
reﬂects a tendency towards some inertia by favoring the status quo, and one of the basic
tenets from bounded rationality is the urge towards relatively simple behavior. Moreover,
dynamic support for the concept was provided by a myopic adjustment process leading
players to eventually coordinate on play within minimal prep sets. The learning process
was motivated by common experimental observations: status quo bias/inertia and the
presence of focal points, in this case the fact that more importance was assigned to the
recent past than to older observations.
C	: The notion of minimal prep sets ﬁts into the research program initiated
by Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996), who concentrate on the
consistency of behavior of players in strategic games. Consistency essentially requires
that if a nonempty set of players commits to playing according to a certain solution,
the players in the reduced game should not have an incentive to deviate from the initial
solution. This appears to be a minimal property that a solution concept should satisfy (see
Aumann, 1987, pp. 478-479, for a general appraisal): if others play the game according to
a certain equilibrium, the solution concept should recommend you to do the same. Yet,
the axiom has a rather dramatic impact: Norde et al. (1996) proved that the unique point-
valuedsolutionconcept for the set of strategic games satisfyingconsistency, incombination
with standard utility maximizing behavior in one-player games and nonemptiness, is the
Nash equilibrium concept. This implies that none of the concepts from the equilibrium
reﬁnement literature is actually consistent. Dufwenberg et al. (1998) indicate that a
transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes this problem: there is a multiplicity of
consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility
maximization in one-player games. Minimal prep sets constitute one such a solution
concept. To see that it is consistent, letX = ×i∈N Xi be a minimal prep set of a strategic
game G = N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N. Suppose that a set S ⊂ N of players commits to playing
according to their recommendation ×i∈S Xi from the minimal prep set X. In the reduced
game G, this implies that the set Ai of each player i ∈ S is reduced to the set Xi,w h i l e
23each player i ∈ N \ S is still allowed to choose freely from Ai.Th es e t X is easily seen
to be a minimal prep set of the reduced game G as well. Consequently, the notion of
minimal prep sets contributes to the research on consistent behavior in strategic games.
E
 : The author does not have the facilities to conduct large scale
experiments to test the prominence of minimal prep sets in a controlled environment. Still,
the minimal prep sets and the corresponding adjustment process were motivated by simple
and inertial behavior of the players, assumptions for which ample experimental evidence is
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